��O F L A W S. 81
rurally requires there fliould be feveral orders be- B K longing to the conftitution under the prince, thechap. n. ftate is more fixed, the conftitution more fteady, and the perfon of him that governs more fecure.
Cicero ( a ) is of opinion, that the eftablifhing of (a) Lib. 3. the tribunes was the prefervation of the republic. de Le S- In fa ft) fays he, the violence of a headlefs people is more terrible. A chief or head is fenfible that the affair depends upon himfelf^ and therefore be <c thinks -, but the people in their impetuofity are ig- <c nor ant of the danger into which they hurry them- <c fehes" This reflection may be applied to a de- fpotic government, which is a people without tri bunes ; and to a monarchy, where the people have fome fort of tribunes.
In fact, it is obfervable, that in the commotions of a defpotic government, the people hurried a- way by their paffions, pulh things always as far as they can go. The diforders they commit are all extreme ; whereas in monarchies things are fel - dom carried to excefs. The chiefs are afraid on their own account, they are afraid of being aban doned ; and the intermediate dependent powers * do not chufe that the people mould have too much the upper hand. It rarely happens that the flates of the kingdom are intirely corrupted. The prince adheres to thefe, and the feditious who have neither will nor hopes to fubvert the government, have neither power nor will to dethrone the prince.
In thefe circumftances men of prudence and au thority interfere ; moderate meafures are firft pro- pofed, then complied with, and things at length
- See the firft note of book 2. ch. 4,
VOL. L G are