CHPA. VI.
Of the manner of forming Judgments.
Book VI.
Chap.4.HENCE arise the different manners of forming judgments. In monarchies the judges chuse the method of arbitration; they deliberate together, they communicate their thoughts in order to come to an agreement, they moderate their opinion to render it conformable to that of others; and the sentiments of the fewest become espoused by the two largest numbers. But this is not agreeable to the nature of a republic. At Rome and in the cities of Greece, the judges never entered into a consultation; each gave his opinion one of these three ways, I absolve, I condemn, it does not appear clear to me[1]: this was because the people judged, or were supposed to judge. But the people are far from being civilians; all these reflections and methods of arbitration are above their reach; they must have only one object, and one single fact set before them; and then they have only to see whether they ought to condemn, to acquit, or to suspend their judgment.
The Romans introduced set forms for actions [2] after the example of the Greeks, and established a rule that each cause should be directed by its proper action. This was necessary in their manner of judging; it was neccssary to fix the state of the question, that the people might have it always before their eyes. Otherwise in a long process,
