Page:Moraltheology.djvu/106

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CHAPTER IV

THE NUMERICAL DISTINCTION OF SINS

I. IF a man steals five pounds from A on one day, and another five pounds from B the day after, he commits two distinct sins of theft. There is no difficulty about such cases. But how many sins does a man commit who, with the intention of seducing a woman, begins with bad talk, immodest looks and touches, and finally attains his end? Or how many sins are committed by one who is almost all day long occupied with bad desires, which are, however, interrupted by his taking his meals and by other occupations? Or how many sins does he commit who sets fire to a building where a dozen people were asleep who all perished in the flames? In order to decide as far as possible such difficult questions as these, and enable penitents to confess the number of their sins according to the divine precept, theologians have drawn up the following rules:

2. RULE I - There are as many sins as there are total objects in sinful actions. By total object is meant an object of the will which either in itself or by the intention of the agent forms a complete whole, and is not referred to another action as a part of the whole. Thus the theft of a sum of money is a complete whole in itself, and forms a total object of the will. Immodest touches may form a complete whole if the intention be restricted to them without an idea of going farther; but if immodest touches are intended as a means to commit further sin, they form one complete whole with the subsequent sin, and make one sin with it.

The reason of the rule is clear from what has been said before. The object specifies the act, and if there be one whole object from a moral point of view, there will be one complete moral action and one sin.

3. RULE II - There are as many sins as there are moral interruptions in the sinful act. We say " moral interruptions " because the laws for confession are to be understood according to the common estimation of ordinary men, not according to the subtle distinctions of the philosopher. And so, if common sense tells us that on account of some interruption in the course