may happen to me, I may nevertheless hunt or use the motorcar as usual. If I kill myself or someone else, it will be merely by accident, for it is presumed that I use reasonable care to avoid mishap.
On the other hand, a superior, whose commands I am bound to obey, may have used his authority to forbid an action on account of the possible evil effect which may follow therefrom. In that case I must abstain from the action by reason of the command of my superior, though otherwise I should be free. And so if a father, for special reasons, forbids his son to go to the theatre, the son should obey, as long as he is subject to parental authority. Again, even though there may be no positive command of a superior, in cases where no good would come from the action, and where the only effects would be evil, I am bound to abstain from the action, which in that case itself becomes evil. Similarly, where the evil effects are largely in excess of the good, right reason tells me that I must abstain from the action. But there are many actions which are forbidden by no lawful authority, which have both good and evil effects, while it is not clear that the latter largely outweigh the former. Am I bound to abstain from such actions, or when am I bound to abstain from them?
4. In order to provide a general rule of conduct in such circumstances, divines have formulated what is known as the principle of a double effect. That principle may be enunciated as follows:
It is lawful to perform an action which produces two effects, one good, the other bad, provided that (i) the action, viewed in itself, is good, or at least indifferent; (2) the agent does not intend the evil effect, but only the good; (3) the good effect is produced as immediately as that is, not by means of the bad; and (4) there is a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect.
This rule will furnish us with a guide in case of doubt whether we are bound to abstain from any given action because of some evil effect which will follow from it. We shall be at liberty to perform the action in question provided that four conditions are realized. In the first place, the action itself, apart from the evil effect, must not be bad. If it is bad in itself, there can be no question about its lawfulness. Further, the agent must not intend the evil effect, though he foresees that it will follow. If he intends it, the evil effect becomes voluntary in itself and imputable to the agent. Then, the good effect must not be the result of the bad, for we must
