Page:Moraltheology.djvu/24

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grave evil is the result of an action which in itself is only venially sinful, as when grave harm is the result of slight negligence. Of course, great evil arising from grave negligence is seriously sinful even though only voluntary in the cause; and so a doctor who through grave negligence kills his patient is guilty of a great sin, though he did not intend the homicide. But supposing that in passing through a gate in the country I leave it open, owing to slight negligence, and in consequence a neighbour's crop is seriously damaged by his cows getting among the corn; do I commit a grave sin in that case? Of course, if owing to the circumstances I clearly foresaw that the damage was certain to follow and I could easily have closed the gate if I chose, I certainly sin grievously in not closing it; the negligence is then grave. But our case supposes circumstances to be such that the negligence is only slight, partly on account of the uncertainty of harm following, partly because I had frequently seen the gate standing open, and for other reasons. Will the neglect to close the gate after me in such circumstances be grievously sinful on account of the serious harm to my neighbour which was the consequence? The answer must be " No." For the harm did not follow necessarily and exclusively from my neglect; my action was not the immediate and necessary cause of the damage done to the crop; other agents intervened; my action was only slightly responsible for what followed. Inasmuch, then, as the malice of the cause is only slight, and this alone is voluntary in itself, the evil effect which is only voluntary in the cause will be imputed only as a venial sin.

6. Theologians dispute about the question whether such a sin of omission as is committed by not closing the gate after me, with resulting loss to my neighbour, can be committed without a special act, by simply neglecting to put the act which was of obligation.

The question is not a very practical one; it will be sufficient to say in reply that physically a man who adverts to the obligation of doing something may hold himself neutral, and so sin by omission without doing anything; practically, however, in such cases, a positive determination is formed not to perform the duty, or at least to perform something else which is foreseen to be an obstacle to the performance of the duty.[1]

7. The question sometimes arises at what time a sin of omission or a sin which is voluntary only in the cause is committed. When a man gets drunk on the Saturday evening

  1. Suarez, tract. 5, d. 3, sec. 2, n. 6.