Page:Moraltheology.djvu/296

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CHAPTER VI

CAUSES WHICH EXCUSE FROM RESTITUTION

i. One who is per se bound to make restitution may sometimes be excused from doing so for special reasons, either entirely or at any rate for a time. It is plain that if the owner does not expect or wish restitution to be made, although he was unwilling to be injured, the obligation will cease. A rich father may be unwilling that his son should take from him a sum of money without his permission, but after it has been done he may not care to exact restitution. Similarly, a wealthy man would be very angry if a neighbour took one of his horses out of the stable and used it for a day's work; he might demand an apology, but he probably would not take any money compensation;>he does not keep livery stables.

2. Physical or moral incapacity to make restitution will be a valid excuse as long as it lasts. If a man has no means, or if he cannot make restitution without reducing himself to beggary, it will be sufficient if he have the wish and intention to restore when he is able to do so. Sometimes it may be possible for one who has stolen a large sum which he cannot at once repay to lay by a little at a time and thus by degrees save the amount required. If this can reasonably be done, it will be of obligation. It would be unreasonable to expect a man to make restitution when it could not be done without costing a great deal more than the object restored was worth, or when restitution of a sum of money would lead to loss of reputation, position, and future prospects. If in such cases means exist for making secret restitution, they should of course be adopted.

When a man becomes bankrupt all his property, with the exception of the tools of his trade and the necessary wearing apparel and bedding for himself, wife, and children, to the value of 20, will vest in the official receiver and trustee. These officials will also be able to claim for the benefit of the creditors future acquisitions of property until the bankrupt has obtained his discharge. The question arises whether after a bankrupt has obtained an absolute discharge he is still liable in conscience to pay any residue that remains of his debts,