Page:Moraltheology.djvu/86

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oaths, and in marriage which has not been consummated, the Pope can for good cause dispense in the name of God, or at least declare that in certain circumstances they have ceased to exist; for whether he then in the strict sense dispenses, or only declares the sense of the divine law, is a disputed point. In practice there is little difference between the two views.

(b) Bishops can dispense in episcopal laws, and even in those of a provincial or plenary council, unless such authority has been reserved. Although they have no authority over the common law of the Church per se, yet by custom and the presumed consent of the Pope, Bishops can in particular cases dispense from the common law in trivial and doubtful matters, in matters which are of frequent occurrence, as in abstinence, fasting, observance of days of obligation, in the divine Office, and even in other matters of greater moment which admit of no delay. [1]

Bishops can dispense not only their own subjects, but strangers also, in such matters as fasting, abstinence, observance of days of obligation, vows, etc. [2]

(c) Regular prelates have quasi- episcopal authority over their own subjects, and can do for them what Bishops can do for their subjects. Moreover, many privileges have been granted by the Popes to regular Orders, by virtue of which they can dispense not only their own subjects but others also.

(d) Although parish priests per se cannot dispense either in general or in particular laws (Can. 83), yet the power is expressly granted to them to dispense in particular cases and for a good reason even outside their parishes particular individuals and families subject to them, and within their parishes strangers also, from the common law of observing feast days and also from the observance of fasting or abstinence or of both fasting and abstinence (Can. 1245). Those who have the cure of souls in places where there are no parish priests in the strict sense have the same authority from the necessity of the case, from custom, and often by implicit or explicit grant. [3]

3. If there be a good and sufficient cause for granting a dispensation, the superior may ordinarily either grant it or refuse to do so, as he judges fit; but if serious public or private harm would follow from not granting a dispensation, charity may require that the favour should be granted. But even in that case, unless the inconvenience is so serious that it excuses

  1. St Alphonsus, i, n. 190.
  2. Can. 1245, 1313.
  3. Concil. Westmon., d. 23, nn. 1,3.