Page:NCGLE v Minister of Justice.djvu/117

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Sachs J

[120]It will be noted that the motif which links and unites equality and privacy, and which, indeed, runs right through the protections offered by the Bill of Rights, is dignity.[1] This Court has on a number of occasions emphasised the centrality of the concept of dignity and self-worth to the idea of equality.[2] In an interesting argument,[3] the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (the Centre) has mounted a frontal challenge to this approach, arguing that the equality clause is intended to advance equality, not dignity, and that the dignity provisions in the Bill of Rights[4] should take care of protecting dignity. This was part of an invitation to the Court to re-visit its whole approach to equality jurisprudence, shifting from what the Centre called the defensive posture of reliance on unlawful discrimination under section 9(3)[5] to what it claimed to be an affirmative position of promoting equality under the broad provisions of section 9(1). The


  1. O’Regan J comments in S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC); 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 328:

    “The importance of dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be overemphasised. Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. This right therefore is the foundation of many of the other rights that are specifically entrenched in Chapter 3.”

  2. President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC); 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at para 41; Prinsloo v van der Linde and Another above n 19 at paras 31–3; Harksen v Lane NO and Others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489; 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at para 50.
  3. In S v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC); 1995 (7) BCLR 793 (CC) at para 129, I had occasion to refer to the importance of “… a principled judicial dialogue, in the first place between members of this Court, then between our Court and other courts, the legal profession, law schools, Parliament, and, indirectly, with the public at large.” The critique by the Centre is to be welcomed, even though normally such generalised observations could be expected to be made in journal articles rather than through amici arguments.
  4. Section 10 provides:

    “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.”

  5. Above n 2.
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