Page:NTSB - Railroad Accident Report - Derailment on May 25, 1989.djvu/45

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short section of rail—were found near the rupture. The brake arm and the rail section were about 2 to 3 feet in length. The brake arm was found 8 inches above the pipeline and the other parts were within 2 feet of the pipeline. Testimony by Calnev’s manager of operations and by equipment operators who had worked at the site following the derailment indicates that the depth of cover they observed over the pipeline at its point of rupture was from 2 to 2½ feet, whereas the depth of cover they had observed after completing work, following the train derailment, was from 4½ to 6 feet. Calnev’s manager of operations testified that the location of the rupture was very near if not at the exact location where the excavation #5 had been performed across from the middle of lot 76 (figure 4).

According to Calnev’s manager of operations, Calnev’s plan to repair the pipeline after the rupture and place it back in service evolved over many days "…during which many discussions were held with many interested parties as to how best to return that pipeline to service [and] make the repairs necessary." Calnev’s maintenance superintendent testified that when the pipeline rupture occurred, he notified the National Response Center, the California Office of Emergency Services, the California State Fire Marshal’s Office, and the Underground Service Alert System. Representatives from these agencies, as well as an engineer from the U.S. Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), responded to the accident site.

On May 26, 1989, OPS issued a Hazardous Facility Order, CPF No. 5987-H to Calnev (appendix E). This Order included preliminary findings, among others, that the pipeline within the area of the derailment had not been completely exposed and visually examined for damage, that the structural integrity of the portion of the pipeline potentially affected by the derailment had not been ascertained by Calnev, and that Calnev had not determined if there had been damage to the pipe coating as a result of the cleanup operations. OPS required Calnev to expose the pipeline around its circumference for the length of pipe between a point 50 feet north of the casing beneath Highland Avenue and the south end of the levee adjacent to the check valve at MP 6.9, to conduct a thorough visual inspection of the exposed pipe to locate any damage to the pipe or to its coating and make appropriate repairs, and in accordance with applicable requirements of 49 CFR Part 195, to hydrostatically test to 1.25 times its maximum operating pressure the pipe located between a point 100 yards south of the check valve on the downstream side of the derailment impact area and a point 200 yards upstream of the road crossing at Highland Avenue.

On May 30, 1989, based on its preliminary findings, OPS found that "if placed into service under the same circumstances as existed after the rupture, that portion of Respondent’s [Calnev’s] pipeline subject to the required corrective actions prescribed [on May 26, 1989] would be hazardous to life and property." Consequently, as a result of conversations with Calnev, the OPS order was amended to require excavation of the pipeline located between a point 10 feet north (downstream) of the casing beneath Highland Avenue and the south (upstream) rise of the Muscoy Levee, that the excavated pipe be visually inspected to determine any damage to the pipe or its coating, that the pipe be replaced with new pipe, that a block valve be installed between the check valve and the Muscoy Levee, that the new pipe be