Page:Nestorius and his place in the history of Christian doctrine.djvu/85

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OF NESTORIUS
73

ὑπόστασιν, it cannot be regarded apart from the ὑπόστασις of the Logos. That is meant by Cyril's ἐκ δύο φύσεων εἷς.

It is easy to perceive that this theory is not conceivable. If it meant that the Logos became man in the manner of a mythical metamorphosis, this would be, although a false, yet a somewhat intelligible theory, and I am convinced that thousands of Cyril's adherents took this to be the meaning of his theory, and that even in our day thousands of simple Christian people understand the incarnation in this mythical interpretation. Cyril, however, asserted that this was not his meaning. Then, as I said, his theory is not conceivable. For what is a nature which has no real existence of its own? Is then the Logos not thought of as suffering and dying, in spite of Cyril's protest? or can one speak of sufferings and death where there is no suffering or dying subject, but only an impersonal nature? And is it still possible to say that Christ was a man as we are, if the human nature existed in him only as assumed in the ὑπόστασις of the Logos and as having become his human nature? Nestorius is quite right in reproaching Cyril that his doctrine resulted in a suppression of the manhood of Christ, for, according to Cyril's doctrine, the human intellect of Christ cannot be realised as operating in him[1]. The Christ of Cyril, as

  1. Liber Herac. B. 341 = N. 218, comp. B. 295 = N. 187: Qu'est ce que l'homme parfait qui n'agit pas et qui n'est pas mû selon la nature