Page:Nietzsche the thinker.djvu/315

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THE "ALTRUISTIC" SENTIMENTS
299

the speaker, and he says (in substance), "If you have an enemy, do not return his evil with good—that will humiliate him; if he curses you, curse a little back; if he does you a great wrong, do him a few small ones—dreadful to behold is one under the weight of wrong that he has done alone; more humane is a little revenge than absolutely no revenge."[1] Of course, this has to be taken in the spirit rather than the letter (like the paradoxes of the Sermon on the Mount), but we do not have to attend long to see that an extreme (if you will, fantastical) tenderness breathes through it. A certain great apostle urged returning the evil of an enemy with good, "for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head." One can hardly say that tenderness for the wrongdoer inspires that; the desire is rather to cover with shame—the subtlest spirit of revenge breathes through it. Which is the truer, or even more Christian spirit, I leave the reader to judge. Nietzsche wanted to spare shame and to purge the world of the spirit of revenge. As he put it, he desired a justice that should be "love with seeing eyes," and that would absolve all, save him who judges. At the same time he knew that this was not a height for every one, but only for those rich in inner wealth, the overflowing.[2]

The analysis of sacrifice resembles that of "love": on the one hand there is a psychological Aufklärung; on the other an assertion of the thing itself, so strong that to many it may seem extreme. It is not unselfish, he declares, when I prefer to think about causality rather than about the lawsuit with my publisher; my advantage and my enjoyment lie on the side of knowledge; my tension, unrest, passion, have been longest active just there.[3] Hence he finds something hypocritical in the current language about sacrifice. Naturally, he says, in order to accomplish what lies near his heart, he throws much away—much that also lies near his heart; but the throwing away is only consequence, incidental result—the bottom fact is that something else lies nearest his heart.[4] And this is why a proposal to reward sacrifice is inept. Nietzsche even

  1. Zarathustra, I, xix.
  2. Ibid., I, xix.
  3. Werke, XIV, 95, § 197.
  4. Ibid., 94, § 196; cf. Beyond Good and Evil, § 220; Twilight etc., ix, § 44; Will to Power, §§ 372, 930.