THE MORAL AIM PROPOSED BY NIETZSCHE
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more or less a help, too much of it a hindrance,[1] but never a basic thing in life—he holds to the old Schopenhauerian view in this respect, which has points of contact with what is called the "instrumental" view now. Nietzsche himself speaks of the necessity of an objective valuation.[2] He believes that he has an objective value. He is in reality the opposite, as Professor Simmel has remarked, of the Greek Sophists or of a thinker like Max Stirner in recent times, for whom the only reality is the individual subject, each subject judging according to its own personal standpoint; in Stirner, not in Nietzsche, is the position of the Sophists revived.
- ↑ Neitzsche says, "everything good is instinct," which is not the same as saying, "every instinct is good," a confusion to which A. S. Prngle-Pattison comes very ner (op. cit., p. 313). Neitzsche’s general view is that consciousness is only an instrument in the development of life—reason too (Beyond Good and Evil, § 191).
- ↑ Will to Power, § 707; cf. Werke, XIII, 135, § 311 (a community's "advantage" distinguished from its pleasurable feelings).
