in itself is different, for to be as a mental experience is only to appear to some one" (A Pluralistic Universe, p. 198; as to feeling in general, see his Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 151) . One may question whether Nietzsche's view was not a logical inference rather than a direct observation.
j The fragment appears in Nietzsche's Briefe, I, 343 ff. Cf. the letters to von Gersdorff (1866), ibid., p. 49; to Paul Deussen, ibid., p. 101; and Richter's general account of the matter, op. cit., pp. 152-3; also Richter's reference to the subject in his Der Skepticismus in der Philosophie, II, 463-4.
k Friedrich Rittelmeyer thinks that Nietzsche continued to hold to the main points of the Schopenhauerian metaphysics for five years after the "Critique of the Schopenhauerian Philosophy," his criticism being directed only to details (Friedrich Nietzsche und das Erkenntnissproblem, pp. 7, 8).
l It is difficult here to get the right word. Nietzsche repeats Schopenhauer's views as to the inapplicability of the category of "causality" in this connection (Werke, X, 193), and yet his constant underlying presupposition is that there are things outside ourselves, which in some way affect us. We receive (empfangen) the stimuli (Reisse)—this is the way in which he always speaks.
m Cf. Helmholtz, "So far as the characteristic quality of our sensation informs of the peculiar nature of the outer influence that excites it, it may pass as a sign of it, but not as a copy.… A sign need have no sort of resemblance to that of which it is the sign. The relation between the two consists simply in the fact that the same object under the same conditions elicits the same sign" (Physiologische Optik, § 26).
n F. H. Bradley, in his Principles of Logic, protested against the reduction of the universe to an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories," and Schopenhauer still earlier had referred to Hegel's "Ballet der Selbstbewegung der Begriffe" (Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 34) .
o Nietzsche had perhaps noted Schiller's line, "Wage du zu irren und zu traumen," which Lange quotes (Geschichte des Materialismus, II, 513). Schiller had also said,
"Nur der Irrthum ist das Leben
Und das Wissen ist der Tod."
p If the ordinary person replies to Bishop Berkeley's arguments about matter, "It is no matter what Bishop Berkeley says," he is quite right: it is no matter—to him, and he probably does better to keep to his instinctive views.
q Cf. a passage in William James's Principles of Psychology, I, 288-9, ending, "Other sculptors, other statues from the same stone! Other minds, other worlds from the same monotonous and inexpressive chaos! My world is but one of a million alike imbedded, alike real to those who may abstract them. How different must be the worlds in the mind of eel, cuttle-fish, or crab!"
CHAPTER VI
a Cf. "Schopenhauer etc.," sect. 1, as to what education may do: while it cannot change the "wahre Ursinn und Grundstoff" of our being, it may free it of weeds, rubbish, and vermin, bring it light and air and rain, and so complete the work of stepmotherly nature.
b Cf. the statement of his four rules of controversial warfare in Ecce Homo, I, § 7. The passage, though written much later, throws such an important light on his general psychology and history that I quote it in full: "War is another matter. I am warlike in my way. To attack is
