present with something "white," and "white" is also necessarily and not contingently present with something "inanimate;" the like also occurs in the contingent, so that these terms are useful for all.
From what has been said then it appears that when the terms are alike both in simple and in necessary propositions, a syllogism does and does not occur, except that if the negative proposition be assumed de inesse there will be a syllogism with a contingent (conclusion), but when the negative is necessary there will be one of the character of the contingent and of the non-inesse, but it is clear also that all the syllogisms are incomplete, and that they are completed through the above-named figures.
Chapter 17
In the second figure, when both premises are assumed contingent, there will be no syllogism, neither when they are taken as affirmative, nor negative, nor universal, nor particular; but when one signifies the simple inesse, and the other the contingent, if the affirmative signifies the inesse, there will never be a syllogism, but if the universal negative (be pure, there will) always (be a
