subsit without their subjects: their distinctions respectively.genus has been stated. It is common then to property and inseparable accident not to subsist without those things in which they arc beheld, for as man does not subsist without risible,[1] so neither can Ethiopian subsist without blackness, and as property is present to every, and always, so also is inseparable accident. Nevertheless, tiny differ, in that property is present to one species alone, as the being risible to man, but inseparable accident, as black, is present not only to an Ethiopian, but also to a crow, to a coal, to ebony, and to certain other things. Moreover, property is reciprocally predicated of that of which it is the property, and is equally (present), but inseparable accident is not reciprocally predicated, besides, the participation of properties is equal, but of accidents one (subject partakes) more, but another less. There are indeed other points of community, and peculiarity of the above-mentioned (predicates), but these are sufficient for their distinction, and the setting forth of their agreement.[2]
- ↑ Risibility is considered to be so dependent upon rationality, as that the latter could not exist without the former, and if this were not so, the term risible would not be a property of man, but only an inseparable accident. Cf. Whately and Mansel.
- ↑ As a digest of the preceding chapters, (from ch. 6, inclusive,) I subjoin the following extract from Wallis : "Quæ omnia (prædicabilia sc.) (utpote Voces communes seu universales) in hoc conveniunt, quod de pluribus prædicari seu dici possint Particularibus, Singularibus, seu Individuis. Cum hoc tamen discrimine; Genus naturam innuit magis generalem; Species magis specialem; (pluribus individuis communem.) Differentia, est quæ specierum sub eodem genere oppositarum, alteram ab altera distinguit; suamque (cui convenit) speciem constituit, ejusque essentiam (unâ cum genere) complet. Proprium, eandem essentiam necessario consequitur. Accidens (commune) ita subjecto suo adesse potest, ut etiam possit abesse, nullam (cum essentiâ) necessariam habens connexionem." Vide Wallis, lib. i. cap. 5.
tions given of them. The latter belong necessarily, and therefore universally, to an essence, whereas the former are those qualities which do necessity belong to any essence, but are mere contingencies. Huyshe. Vide also note ch. 4, and cf. Albert de Predicab. Tract, vi. cap. 1.
