admit," &c. &C. [1] It is quite clear from these passages that perception of external things in Space, according to Kant, precedes all application of the causal law, therefore that the causal law does not belong to perception as an element and condition of it : for him, mere sensation is identical with perception. Only in as far as we ask what may, in a transcendental sense, exist outside of us : that is, when we ask for the thing in itself, is Causality mentioned as connected with perception. Moreover Kant admits the existence, nay, the mere possibility, of causality only in reflection : that is, in abstract, distinct knowledge by means of conceptions ; therefore he has no suspicion that its application is anterior to all reflection, which is nevertheless evidently the case, especially in empirical, sensuous perception which, as I have proved irrefragably in the preceding analysis, could never take place otherwise. Kant is therefore obliged to leave the genesis of empirical perception unexplained. With him it is a mere matter of the senses, given as it were in a miraculous way : that is, it coincides with sensation. I should very much like my reflective readers to refer to the passages I have indicated in Kant s work, in order to convince themselves of the far greater accuracy of my view of the whole process and connection. Kant's extremely erroneous view has held its ground till now in philosophical literature, simply because no one ventured to attack it ; therefore I have found it necessary to clear the way in order to throw light upon the mechanism of our knowledge.
Kant's fundamental idealistic position loses nothing whatever, nay, it even gains by this rectification of mine, in as far as, with me, the necessity of the causal law is absorbed and extinguished in empirical perception as its product and cannot therefore be invoked in behalf of an
- ↑ Kant, "Krit. d. r. Vern." 1st edition, p. 372. (English translation, p. 323.)
