results throughout the country of the profoundest importance before any judicial question can arise or be decided, -as in the case of the first and second charters of the United States Bank, and of the legal tender laws of thirty years ago and later. The constitutionality of a bank charter divided the cabinet of Washing- ton, as it divided political parties for more than a generation. Yet when the first charter was given, in 1791, to last for twenty years, it ran through its whole life unchallenged in the courts, and was renewed in 1816. Only after three years from that did the ques- tion of its constitutionality come to decision in the Supreme Court of the United States. It is peculiarly important to observe that such a result is not an exceptional or unforeseen one; it is a result anticipated and clearly foreseen. Now, it is the legislature to whom this power is given, this power, not merely of enacting laws, but of putting an interpretation on the constitution which shall deeply affect the whole country, enter into, vitally change, even revolutionize the most serious affairs, except as some individual may find it for his private interest to carry the matter into court. So of the legal tender legislation of 1863 and later. More important action, more intimately and more seriously touching the interests of every member of our population, it would be hard to think of. The constitutionality of it, although now upheld, was at first denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. The local courts were divided on it, and professional opinion has always been divided. Yet it was the legislature that determined this question, not merely primarily, but once for all, except as some individual, among the innumerable chances of his private affairs, found it for his interest to raise a judicial question about it.
It is plain that where a power so momentous as this primary authority to interpret is given, the actual determinations of the body to whom it is intrusted are entitled to a corresponding respect; and this not on mere grounds of courtesy or conventional respect, but on very solid and significant grounds of policy and law. The judiciary may well reflect that if they had been regarded by the people as the chief protection against legislative violation of the constitution, they would not have been allowed merely this incidental and postponed control. They would have been let in, as it was sometimes endeavored in the conventions to let them in, to a revision of the laws before they began to operate.[1] As the oppor-
- ↑ The constitutioni of Colombia, of 1886, art. 84, provides that the judges of the Supreme Court may take part in the legislative debates over " bills relating to civil
