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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| down to 77,000 and under Vietnamese command by July 1955; (4) the U.S. should assume training responsibility by 1 January 1955; and (5) the French are agreeable to a slow build-up of MAAG. Dulles Memorandum for the- President, 17 November 1954 | 800 | |
| 222. | The French Ambassador is informed by the FOA that, subject to agreement, the U.S. contemplates $100 million support for the FEC in Indochina for CY 1955. The Defense Department has "never agreed to the original position paper," which is based on General Collins' recommendations, without details of his calculations. ISA Memorandum for Record, 24 November 1954 | 802 |
| 223. | Senator Mansfield states his conclusions based on General Collins' analysis of the Vietnam situation: (1) prospects for Diem "look very dim," elections in 1956 would probably favor the communists; (2) the U.S. should continue to support Vietnam as long as possible; (3) he sees no alternative to Diem; (4) he is certain refugees, Catholic bishops and church officials would oppose replacement of Diem; (5) Paris should urge Bao Dai cease his interference and support Diem; (6) and Diem should be encouraged to compromise on issues. State Memorandum of Conversation, 7 December 1954 | 806 |
| 224. | The French Government is considering the decision to accelerate withdrawal of the FEC and evacuation of civilians as a direct result of the U.S. decision to provide only one-third the amount request ed for maintenance of the FEC in 1955. Paris 2448 to Dulles, 9 December 1954 | 809 |
| 225. | Diem "passes the buck" of convincing the sect leaders not to oppose the appointment of Dr. Quat as Defense Minister to the U S. Collins is convinced that Diem and his brothers, Luyen and Nhu, are afraid of Quat or any strong man in control of the armed forces since with "spineless General Ty" as Chief of Staff, Diem has effectively seized control of the army. Further, Collins comments on the alternatives to Diem Government; though the alternative of gradual withdrawal from Vietnam "is least desirable, in all honesty, and in view, of what I have observed here to date it is possible this may be the only sound solution." Collins (Saigon) 2250 to Dulles, 13 December 1954 | 811 |
| 226. | The Defense Department reviews the military aid situation in Indochina including the value of MAP shipments ($1,085 million) and losses of equipment at Dien |
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