Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/173

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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FRON PARIS, 2601 DECEMBER 19, 4 PM SECTION ONE OF TWO

him to take charges he consider necessary. Secretary finished by asking whether Ely had, with Collins, already applied maximum pressures to Diem.

El replied they had and that both were now virtually convinced that it was hopeless to expect anything of Diem. Nevertheless they continued pressures. Secretary asked whether Diem had ye been confronted with ultimatum that unless such and such were done by certain date our support would be withdrawn. Ely said he had not RPT not. He characterized Diem as extremely pig-headed man who became more so under pressure. Secretary asked if this meant that ultimatum would make him more stubborn and Ely replied it would.

Mendes then pursued subject with Ely who stated that he felt that to exert too much pressure on diem was not RPT not in keeping with the new independent status of Vietnam and that in any case such pressure should not RPT not be exerted jointly but separately by himself and Collins. Moreover, he described Diem as having tendency play one man against other in typical Asiatic style and that this was to be avoided. He commented on Diem's own difficulties, especially those he had had in reconciling sect. Principal question was to decide whether Diem was really man capable of national union. He and Collins must decide that question.

Secretary stated that he was opposed to issuance ultimatum until we knew what we would do if it here rejected. At the moment we have nothing else to offer, he commented, Mendes recommended that we approach Bao Dai because of his legal powers and usefulness and fact that presumably would have to appoint any successor to Diem. He had proven in Hinh case that he could be useful and Mendes felt that Bao Dai could again serve purpose. He could be used to put alternate plan into effect if ultimatum to Diem failed. Secretary commented that he realized that we must be prepared to use Bao Dai but felt that we must go to him prepared with our own ideas and not RPT not simply to accept his. Mendes agreed but commented that Bao Dai's personal position had weakened recently.

In spite
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