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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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262. | The JCS assess the implications of U.S. military operations to repulse and punish overt Viet Minh aggression or to destroy Viet Minh forces and take control of North Vietnam in the event of renewed hostilities. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for NSC, 15 September 1955 | 1001 |
263. | The State Department relates the political actions necessary under a deterrent strategy and in a situation of overt Viet Minh aggression. In either situation, the U.S. has to provide substantial economic assistance. State Department Draft Study, 6 October 1955 | 1016 |
264. | The Staff Planners conclude that the successful defense of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is wholly dependent on timely deployment of SEATO forces, an unlikely event, or on the use of nuclear weapons to reduce force requirements. Other conclusions and recommendations are made which deal with overt attacks, combating subversion, logistics, and psychological warfare. SEACDT Military Staff Planners Conference, 16 November 1955 | 1020 |
265. | Asian members of SEATO are pressuring for a "permanent SEATO Council and Military Staff organization." The U.S. position to avoid such a commitment is rapidly becoming untenable. The Asian signatories to SEACDT are losing faith in SEATO as a deterrent for communist expansion. ISA Memorandum for Secretary of Navy, 16 December 1955 | 1043 |
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