NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| Control: | 5014 |
| Rec'd: | April 9, 1955 |
| 2:27 P.M. |
| FROM: | SAIGON |
| TO: | Secretary of State |
| NO: | 4448, APRIL 9, 10 P.M. (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE) |
NIACT
FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS.
DEPARTMENT TELEGRAMS 4411 and 4412.
6. It would be preferable to make change after Bandung in order avoid giving Viet Minh propaganda advantage for exploitation at conference. However, since Diem is still threatening to take independent action to remove Sang after Easter weekend, over strong French objections, it may be desirable effect change as soon as U.S. and French have reached agreement on case to be presented to Bao Dai. While I recognize difficulties this crisis creates for U.S. in view of our well-known association with Diem, I fear continued delay will lead to even graver problems of deteriorating French-U.S. cooperation in Viet Nam, intensification of civil disorders culminating, possibly, in civil war, and not improbable ultimate loss of all Vietnam to Viet Minh. This eventuality would be damaging not only to U.S. prestige but, more importantly I am convinced, to U.S. security. Mechanics of possible change of government are discussed in Part I above.
7. Our agreement to replacement of Diem admittedly will be difficult to explain to American and world press. I would suggest something along following lines:
A. Diem had made a great contribution to his country at a time when his particular qualities here most valuable. He maintained calm after Geneva, contributed to exodus of refugees from north with its great psychological impact, successfully mustered world opinion in support of aid to these refugees and with support of France and U.S. developed soon and progressive social, political, economic and military
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