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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
INCOMING TELEGRAM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION COPY

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Control: 10492
Rec'd: APRIL 19, 1955
10:57 PM


FROM: SAIGON
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 4661, APRIL 19, 11 PM (SECTION TWO OF THREE)

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 4661, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 1207

FOR SECRETARY FROM COLLINS

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION.

6. Ely repeated his belief that past support for diem had not been an error. He said that we must now envisage changing Prime Minister but not repeat not policy. This, he said, corresponds to wishes of Vietnamese people. I asked Ely how he could prove such is will of Vietnamese people in absence of any assembly. Statement can only represent Ely's estimate. He replied it is obvious that people wish to be rid of Diem. I replied Diem could challenge statement and, in any case, no one was in position to prove Vietnamese people wished to be rid of Diem. Ely said present crisis itself was evidence. I replied that crisis had been caused by Sect minority looking after own selfish interests. Same governmental program under another Prime Minister would inevitably have led to opposition from Sects. Ely said that if such other Prime Minister had been similar to Diem he would agree, but Diem had handled situation very badly, and even his own relatives, Do and Thoai, no longer believed in him.

7. I told Ely he and I were foreigners here and even Bao Dai was to some extent foreign. None of us could say whether Vietnamese people were united as to choice of any successor to Diem. Without parliament, it cannot be proved to U.S. public and press opinion that Diem is no longer wanted. If Diem was removed in absence of some representative body, I could not predict U.S. congressional reaction. Therefore,

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