NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
offers from the government. We believe that a considerable number of the Binh Xuyen may attempt to resume their life of piracy and extortion. The VNA should be able to reduce the Binh Xuyen to the level of a local nuisance.
13. The sects. We believe that for the immediate future the Cao Dai military forces under Generals The and Phuong will continue actively to support Diem against the Binh Xuyen and Bao Dai. The Hoa Hao are unlikely to play an important role in the immediate situation, a)though the Ba Cut forces may continue their terrorist operations.
14. The Viet Minh. The Viet Minh probably fear that Diem's continuation in office would limit the prospects of a peaceful unification of Vietnam under terms favorable to the Communists. They will probably continue covert efforts in South Vietnam to keep the situation agitated. The Communists almost certainly will not invade South Vietnam in the near future.
GENERAL OUTLOOK
15. In present circumstances, we do not believe that Diem could be persuaded voluntarily to resign. Ii he were forced from office many of Diem's followers would probably undertake revolutionary opposition, including maquis resistance, to the successor regime. Some VNA elements in Saigon and in central Vietnam would probably join these elements in resisting the new government.
16. Assuming that the US continues to support Diem, and that the French acquiesce, we believe the situation will stabilize in Saigon under Diem's control. Diem's talents as an administrator are unlikely to improve. His success, achieved largely on his own initiative and with his own resources, is likely to make him more independent and less amenable to policy guidance. Diem's government will still be confronted with manifold internal problems — e.g., integration of the sects, resettlement of refugees, land reform, extension of government authority in the provinces, and training of the army. Although Diem has improved his position, we believe that it will still be extremely difficult, at best, for Diem or any Vietnamese government to build sufficient strength to meet the long-range challenge of the Communists.
SECRET
