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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| granting full independence and provide for phased withdrawal of French forces; and (4) the force structure should be dictated by local military requirements. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 4 August 1954 | 701 | |
| 191. | The Chief MAAG outlines his point of view of the U.S. part in the fut-are of Vietnam. His mission is twofold: establish U.S. courses of action to insure survival of Free Vietnam as a nation and develop Vietnam as an effective barrier to Communist expansion. Saigon 3024A, 8 August 1954 | 703 |
| 192. | The French have been lead to believe that Dulles made an offer of the use of atomic bombs at Dien Bien Phu and that Bidault was "much upset" by the offer and felt that they would have done no good tactically. There is concern that Bidault -- "ill, nervous, hypersensitive and bitter" might attempt to publicize his version and take credit for preventing the use of atom bombs as "suggested by the U.S." Paris 558 to Dulles, 9 August 1954 | 705 |
| 193. | Dulles has "no recollection whatever of the alleged offer" of atomic bombs to the French and indicates "it is incredible that I should have made the offer…." Dulles 501 to Paris, 9 August 1954 | 706 |
| 194. | On the offer of atomic bombs, the French agree that there has been a complete misunderstanding, possibly based on language difficulties. On the day of Dulles "alleged" offer, Bidault had been "ill, jittery, overwrought" and, even to the French staff, "incoherent." Paris 576 to Dulles, 10 August 1954 | 708 |
| 195. | The JCS review U.S. policy in the Far East - NSC 5429. They recommend that NSC 5429 be returned to the Planning Board for "exposition of U.S. objectives" and "delineation of broad courses of action" in the Far East. Extensive Comments by the Army Chief of Staff on NSC 5429 ("It is not a comprehensive review of the entire problem…WE DO NOT HAVE EITHER TO APPEASE COMMUNIST CHINA OR TO DESTROY IT.") are included. JCS Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 11 August 1954 | 709 |
| 196. | The JCS comment on a draft State Department message for the French Prime Minister regarding U.S. policy toward Indochina. They feel the message should state clearly that the assumption of training responsibility in Vietnam by the U.S. is contingent on the preconditions stated in their 4 August memorandum (see Document 185). JCS Memorandum tor Secretary of Defense, 12 August 1954 | 714 |
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