Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/60

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
SECRET

direction required for the raising and maintenance of armed forces. Unless a reasonably stable government is established, the United States training mission would lack authority and governmental support essential to the successful accomplishment of its mission.

4. While the French Government has announced its intention to grant independence to the Associated States, it has not announced a plan for the scheduled relinquishment of French authority or for the withdrawal of French officials from Indochina affairs. The residual responsibility and authority, if any, to be retained by the French Government, particularly with respect to the control to be exercised over the armed forces of the Associated States, has not yet been made clear. If, in fact, the French were to retain a degree of authority and direction in the organization and training of the indigenous forces, the United States training mission would bc prevented from discharging its responsibilities completely independent of French participation and control.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the proposed message is not an unqualified commitment to furnish military aid or to provide training assistance to the Associated States. They are in accord with the stated purpose of the message, to reassure both the French and Associated States Governments of the United States intention to assist 1n preventing an eventual Communist take-over in Indochina. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the proposed message should state in clearer terms that the final United States decision as to the extent of military aid and the assumption of responsibility for traininG will be contingent upon the establishment of the prerequisite conditions discussed in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 above. As presently worded, the proposed message might convey to the French that U.S. decisions with respect to these matters have already been taken, without definite French commitments as to their intentions. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the message should be more specific with regard to the United States desire that its representatives deal directly with the Governments of the Associated States and that all United States military material aid should eventually given directly to the Associated States rather than through the French Government.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the substance of the foregoing views be transmitted to the{{dhr}

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SECRET