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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON


AUG 12 1954


Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Chief of MAAG, Indochina, has recommended that the United States assume responsibility for the training of the Vietnamese Army. As you know, representatives of the Governments of all three Associated States have, in their contacts with United States officials in Indochina, asked for United States assistance in training the indigenous forces of those States.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered this question and have recommended that, before the United States undertakes the training of forces of any of the Associated states, certain preconditions essential to the success of such an effort be met. As stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these preconditions include:

"From the military point of view it is absolutely essential that there be a reasonably strong, stable civil government in control. It is hopeless to expect a U.S. military training mission to achieve success unless the nation concerned is able effectively to perform those governmental functions essential to the successful raiSing and maintenance of armed forces, to include the provision of adequate facilities, drafting and processing of personnel, pay of troops, etc. Unless the foregoing conditions prevail, a U.S. training mission would lack the authority and governmental support essential to the successful accomplishment of its mission.

"The government of each of the Associated States concerned should formally request that the United States assume responsibility for training their forces and providing the military equipment, financial assistance, and political advice. necessary to insure internal stability.

"Arrangements should be made with the French granting full independence to the Associated States and providing for the phased, orderly withdrawal of French forces, French officials, and French advisors from Indochina in order to provide motivation and a sound basis for the establishment of national armed forces. The United States from the beginning should insist on dealing directly with the governments of the respective Associated States, completely independent of French participation or control.

717


SECRET
SecDef Cont. No. 5-0173