Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part-V-B-3c.djvu/74

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

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Viet Nam: one, to strengthen the government by means of a political and economic nature and the other, to bolster that government by strengthening the army which supports it.

The second precondition established by the Joint Chiefs is that the Governments of the Associated States should formally request that the U.S. assume responsibility for training their forces and providing military equipment. As indicated above the Government of Laos has made no such request and does not contemplate one. However, the Government of Viet Nam, in a letter from Prime Minister Prince Buu Loo to the American Charge d'Affaires dated June 28, 1954, did request that MAAG Saigon participate in troop training and requested U.S. assistance in providing adequate armament and in financing a proposed expanded troup base. In the case of Cambodia, the Cambodian Minister of National Defense, General Nhek Tioulong in a letter dated May 20, 1954, addressed to General John W. O'Donnel, Chief of MAAG Saigon, stated that the Royal Khmer Government was anxious to complete plans to set up in the minimum of time three divisions according to the methods of accelerated instruction used in Korea, on condition that the U.S. Government assured the Cambodian Government of indispensable financial and materiel support.

The third precondition of the Joint Chiefs calls for arrangements with the French guaranteeing full independence to the Associated States and providing for the phased withdrawal of French forces, French officials, and French advisors from Indochina in order to provide motivation and a sound basis for the establishment of National armed forces.

The case of Laos may be set aside since Laos has not requested U.S. assistance and under the terms of its military agreement with France is required to look to France for aid in training and other purposes. Furthermore, under the terms of the cease-fire agreement Laos is estopped from introducing foreign military personnel other than "a specified number of French military personnel required for the training of the Laotian National Army."

In the case of Cambodia, de facto full independence already exists. Likewise during 1953 and early 1954 command of the Royal Khmer Army was handed over to the King of Cambodia and French forces have been entirely withdrawn from Cambodian soil. There is a minimum of French advisors still attached to the Royal Khmer Army.

In the case of Viet Nam, practically the entire French Expenditionary Corps still remains in that country. It would be militarily disastrous to demand the withdrawal of French forces from Free Viet Nam before the

creation

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