Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
III. C. 2.
SINO–SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY
TABLE OF CONTENTS and OUTLINE
| Page | ||||
| 1. | USSR and China are Motivated by Different Objectives | C-18 | ||
| a. | Atmosphere at Geneva is Different from Panmunjon | C-18 | ||
| b. | Soviet Objectives | C-18 | ||
| (1) | USSR Seeks to Avert a Major International Crisis | |||
| (2) | USSR Wishes to Prevent French Support of EDC | |||
| (3) | USSR Seizes the Opportunity to Create a New Communist State | |||
| c. | Chinese Objectives: The Need for Border Security | C-19 | ||
| (1) | China's Policy Calls for Assistance to "Wars of National Liberation" | |||
| (2) | China Wary of U.S. Intervention | |||
| (3) | China Wishes to Prevent Laos and Cambodia from Becoming U.S. Allies | |||
| (4) | China Attempts to Enhance the Image of "Peaceful Co-existence" | |||
| 2. | USSR and China Serve as Moderating Influences on the Viet Minh | C-21 | ||
| a. | Opening Position of Both Countries Supports DRV Hard Line | C-21 | ||
| b. | Shift to Support of Bilateral French–DRV Discussions is Apparent Early | C-22 | ||
| c. | USSR and China Change DRV Approach to Cease-fire | C-22 | ||
| d. | DRV Responds to Sino–Soviet Pressure on Partition | C-22 | ||
| e. | Molotov Proposes Compromise on Elections | C-23 | ||
C-16
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
