Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
- b. Shift to Support of Bilateral French–DRV Discussions is Apparent Early
The Soviet and Chinese delegations — much more than the Viet Minh — were more anxious for direct Franco–Viet Minh discussions. The fact that Soviet officials on 30 March and again 5 May told Western officials that bilateral talks would be the most profitable form of negotiations for a cease-fire9 suggests that the communists' initial backing of Pham Van Dong's proposal may have been simply a trial balloon. Once the French, supported by the U.K. and U.S., refused to budge from their call for an immediate, closely inspected cease-fire, Chou and Molotov were left free to initiate talks in the direction of compromise.
- c. USSR and China Change DRV Approach to Cease-fire
The pressure that the Chinese and the Soviets were able to bring to bear apparently forced the DRV to acquiesce in a cease-fire prior to a military settlement. Pham Van Dong had argued for a plan which would have made a cease-fire throughout Indochina contingent on the satisfaction of Viet Minh conditions for general elections and the formation of three united governments. But at the first restricted session of the Conference on 17 May, Molotov pointed out that French proposals up to that point had dealt only with military matters, and proposed therefore that these be dealt with before going on to political arrangements.10 The Chinese agreed with this approach. In a conversation with Eden, Chou En-lai concurred in the separation of military from political matters, with priority to a cease-fire.11 When, therefore, Hoang Van Hoan reportedly told Le Monde on 24 May that the DRV posed "not a single prior political condition," he was reflecting the views of the Soviets and Chinese as much as paying the way for Dong's initiative of the next day.
- d. DRV Responds to Sino–Soviet Pressure on Partition
There is evidence to believe that both the Chinese and the Soviets were instrumental in bringing about a series of Viet Minh concessions on the issue of where to draw the demarcation line between North and South Vietnam. The possibility of partition had been suggested initially to U.S. officials as early as 4 March by a member of the Soviet Embassy in London, apparently out of awareness of Franco–American objections to a coalition arrangement.12 The partition line mentioned at that time was the 16th parallel, which would have placed Tourane (Da Nang) in the hands of the Viet Minh (the 16th parallel crosses a few miles south of the port). It was also the Soviets who, on the opening day of the conference, approached the U.S. delegation on partition — this time averring that the establishment of a buffer state to China's south would be sufficient satisfaction of China's security needs.13
In late June, after several rounds of secret Franco–Viet Minh military talks had failed to make headway, Ta Quang Buu (Vice Minister of National Defense) was still insisting on the 13th parallel, which strikes the coast just south of Tuy Hoa, as the partition line.14 As suggested
