Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part III.djvu/113

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET – Sensitive

14.	Lacouture and Devillers, pp. 238–39.
15.	Ibid., pp. 239–40.
16.	CIA Memo: "Asian Communist Employment of Negotiations as a Political Tactic" (SECRET), RSS 0017/66.
17.	Lacouture and Devillers, pp. 257–58.
18.	Smith from Geneva tel. SECTO 632, July 17, 1954 (SECRET).
19.	Lacouture and Devillers, p. 268.
20.	Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 638, July 18, 1954 (SECRET).
21.	Smith from Geneva tel. SECTO 632, July 17, 1954 (SECRET).
22.	Ibid.
23.	Smith from Geneva tel. SECTO 645, July 18, 1954 (SECRET).
24.	Lacouture and Devillers, p. 268.
25.	See, e.g., Lacouture and Devillers, p. 213.
26.	Ibid., p. 215.
27.	This was the demand made by the Viet Minh in secret talks with the French. Reported in Smith's priority tel. from Geneva DULTE 187, June 16, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
28.	Smith from Geneva tel. DULTE 193, June 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
29.	Smith tel. DULTE 193 from Geneva, June 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET). See also Lacouture and Devillers, pp. 217 and 219.
30.	In a talk with Smith June 19, Molotov discussed the Laos and Cambodia resistance movements and said he saw the possibility of agreement so long as neither side (i.e., the French or the Viet Minh) "adopted one-sided views or put forward extreme pretensions." Molotov said about 50 percent of Laotian territory was not controlled by the royal government (a curious way of putting it), with a much smaller movement in Cambodia. The tone of Smith's report on this conversation suggests that Molotov saw no obstacles to Viet Minh withdrawal of its "volunteers." Smith tel. DULTE 202 from Geneva, June 19, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
31.	Johnson from Geneva tel. SECTO 514, June 23, 1954 (SECRET).
32.	See e.g., Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 637, July 17, 1954 (SECRET).
33.	Smith from Geneva priority tel. SECTO 638, July 18, 1954 (SECRET).