Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
| 1. | Dillon priority tel. No. 5035 from Paris, June 24, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
| 2. | Smith tel. SECTO 636 from Geneva, July 17, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 3. | Smith NIACT tel. SECTO 639 from Geneva, July 18, 1954 (SECRET). |
| 4. | CIA Memorandum RSS 0017/66, p. 46 (SECRET/NoFornDis/Controlled Dis). |
| 5. | Mackintosh, pp. 84–85. |
| 6. | The declarations may be found, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945–1965, Misc. No. 25, Cmnd. 2834 (London: H.M.S.O., 1965), pp. 76 (Cambodia) and 79 (Laos). |
| 7. | In a talk with the Cambodian Foreign Minister Sam Sary, Philip Bonsai suggested that it would not be possible to guarantee Cambodia's security by a Conference mechanism subject to communist veto. Bonsai said, however, that once a satisfactory cease-fire were concluded, one that did not prevent Cambodia from cooperating with other non-communist states in defense matters, "he was confident U.S. and other interested countries looked forward to discussing with Cambodian Government" the security problem. (Johnson priority tel. SECTO 627 from Geneva, July 16, 1954, SECRET.) When Sam Sary called a few days later on Smith in the company of Nong Kimny (Ambassador to Washington), the Under Secretary recommended that Phnom Penh, at the Conference, state its intention not to have foreign bases on its territory and not to enter into military alliances. At the same time, though, Cambodia would be free to import arms and to employ French military instructors and technicians. While Cambodia would thus perhaps not be free to join the contemplated SEATO, she might still benefit from it. Smith "assured the Cambodian Foreign Minister that, in our view, any aggression overt or covert against Cambodian territory would bring pact into operation even though Cambodia not a member. I took position that French Union membership afforded Cambodia adequate desirable means of securing through France necessary arms, some of which would be American, as well as necessary instructors and technicians, some of which might well be American trained." Nong Kimny "limited himself to statement that Cambodia relies heavily on U.S. for eventual protection against aggression and that Cambodia desires to emerge from current conference with maximum freedom of action re measures Cambodia may take to assure defense." Smith tel. SECTO 650 from Geneva, July 18, 1954 (CONFIDENTIAL). |
| 8. | See Chauvel's report in Johnson's priority tel. SECTO 553 from Geneva, July 2, 1954 (TOP SECRET). Also: Lacouture and Devillers, p. 238. |
| 9. | Dillon from Paris tel. No. 32, July 2, 1954 (TOP SECRET). |
D-10
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
