Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part III.djvu/50

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET – Sensitive

1.	Johnson priority tel. SECTO 557 from Geneva, July 3, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
2.	Smith tel. SECTO 267 from Geneva, May 20, 1954 (SECRET).
3.	Smith tel. DULTE 193 from Geneva, June 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
4.	Dulles to Smith tel. TEDUL 196, June 14, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
5.	Dulles priority tel. TEDUL 212 to Smith at Geneva, June 17, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
6.	Dulles "eyes only" tel. TEDUL 222 to Smith at Geneva, June 18, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
7.	Smith from Geneva priority tel. DULTE 195, June 18, 1954 (SECRET).
8.	Smith from Geneva tel. DULTE 202, June 19, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
9.	Dulles to American Consulate – Geneva tel. TOSEC 478. June 24, 1954 (SECRET).
10.	In Dulles to American Embassy – Paris tel. No. 4852, June 28, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
11.	New York Times, June 29, 1954, p. 2.
12.	Anthony Eden, Memoirs: Full Circle (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 149.
13.	Dulles to American Embassy – Paris "eyes only" for Dillon priority tel. No. 52, July 3, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
14.	Ibid.
15.	Dillon from Paris priority tel. No. 50, July 6, 1954 (SECRET).
16.	Dulles to American Embassy – Paris tel. No. 77, July 7, 1954 (SECRET). Regarding the U.S. view of a Ho Chi Minh electoral victory, we not only have the well-known comment of Eisenhower that Ho, at least in 1954, would have garnered 80 per cent of the vote, but also the privately expressed view of Livingston Merchant (Dept. of State) that Ho would be the likely winner. See the latter in Dept, of State Memorandum of Conversation of May 31, 1954, at which Merchant reportedly "felt their [the Associated States'] status was sufficiently independent so that they could freely express their will on a point of this type, although he recognized the possibility that in Viet Nam Ho might win a plebiscite, if held today." (TOP SECRET).