Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 105. | NIE 63–56 (S). |
| 106. | MAAG Country Statement for Vietnam as of 31 December 1956, pp. 12 and 18 (S). |
| 107. | MAAG Vietnam Country Statement for Vietnam as of 31 December 1957 (S), p. 16. |
| 108. | "Report on the Proposed Organization of the Law Enforcement Agencies of the RVN," MSU Police Advisory Staff, Saigon, Vietnam, April 1956. |
| 109. | Despatch, Saigon to State 276, 4 January 1960 (S) |
| 110. | Despatch, Saigon to State, 400, 29 May 1959 (S). JCS History. |
| 111. | The best available account of the Civil Guard dispute is contained in John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid, pp. 64–70. |
| 112. | PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 30–58 (S). |
| 113. | Page C-22. |
| 114. | Duncanson, op. cit., p. 305. |
| 115. | Speaking in 1954, President Eisenhower gave eloquent testimony to this type of reasoning: "If you could win a big one, you would certainly win a little one." (Quoted in Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 25). |
| 116. | PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest, 18 May 1956 (S), p. 16. |
| 117. | Ibid., p. 17. |
| 118. | Report of the SMM, August 1954–August 1955 (S). This Mission, headed by then Colonel Edward Lansdale, USAF, was particularly concerned with unorthodox methods of combatting the Communists. Colonel Lansdale subsequently served as a member of TRIM under O'Daniel, but his activities were specialized. |
| 119. | e.g., "Tactical unit personnel and equipment have been employed on numerous occasions in the government's agricultural land development program, civilian relocation and resettlement program and in pacification and security missions. Such operations reduce the effectiveness of formal training programs.... The Civil Guard should eventually assume complete responsibility for internal security of the nation." MAAG Narrative Statement, November 1958 (S), revised to include changes through 31 March 1959 (S). |
| 120. | Consider, for example, not only U.S. efforts to establish clear lines of authority from the GVN to its armed forces, but also that no discussion has been found in the available data pertaining to the desirability of a complete tri-service establishment, complete with a Marine Corps. |
| 121. | Army Information Digest, November 1960, pp. 36–37. |
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