Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 28. | With reference to the question of training Vietnamese forces the Joint Chiefs' of Staff desire to point out that in addition to the current unstable political situation in Vietnam the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement have been interpreted to limit the strength of MAAG, Indochina to 342 personnel. Even if all these military personnel were replaced by U.S. civilians to perform the normal functions of the MAAG and the military personnel were thereby released for training duties only, the number of U.S. personnel would permit only limited participation in the over-all training program. Under these conditions, U.S. participation in training not only would probably have but limited beneficial effect but also would assure responsibility for any failure of the program." (Italics added). Memorandum for SECDEF from JCS, "Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina," 19 October 1954 (TS) |
| 29. | James M. Gavin, Crisis Now, p. 49. |
| 30. | Memorandum to SECDEF from JCS, "Indochina," 17 November 1954 (TS). |
| 31. | NSC Record of Action 131b, 27 January 1955 (TS). JCS History. Memorandum, SECDEF to Service Secretaries and JCS, "Report on Vietnam for the NSC," 3 February 1955 (TS). |
| 32. | NIE 63–7-54, 23 November 1954 (S). Excluded from this estimate are those Hoa Hao forces under the control of the VNA or the French. |
| 33. | Report to SECSTATE by J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative in Vietnam, January 20, 1955 (TS). |
| 34. | Discussions with a member of US MAAG in 1954–1955 period (U). |
| 35. | "...the government by force and bribery has drastically reduced the importance of these groups to challenge its authority." NIE 63.1–3-55, 11 October 1955. "All significant sect resistance in South Vietnam has been eliminated...." NIE 63–56, 17 July 1956. (S). |
| 36. | NIE 63–5-54, 3 August 1954. (S). |
| 37. | Ibid. |
| 38. | NIE 63–7-54, 23 November 1954 (S). |
| 39. | In fact, many estimates failed to make any distinction between northern and southern forces. See MAAG Narrative Statement dated August 23, 1958 (S), which estimated "Viet Cong strength in North Vietnam" at 268,000. |
| 40. | For particularly detailed estimates of Viet Minh organization in South Vietnam, see Department of State documents, "The Communist Subversive Threat in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos," DR/SP 57.1, December 29, 1955 (S); and "The Communist Subversive Threat to the SEATO Treaty Areas, II. The Subversive Threat in South Vietnam," DRF SP-62, October 24, 1956 (S). |
| 41. | NIE 91, 4 June 1953 (S). |
| 42. | NIE 63–7-54, 23 November 1954 (S). |
| 43. | NIE 63.1–2-55, 26 April 1955 (TS). |
| 44. | NIE 63–5-54, 3 August 1954 (Italics added) (S). |
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