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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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IV.A.5.
Tab 2
FOOTNOTES
| 1. | Hammer, op. cit., 26–35; Shaplen, op. cit., 128–132. Also, U.S. Department of State, Political Alignments of Vietnamese Nationalists (Office of Intelligence Research, Report No. 3708, October 1, 1949), passim. |
| 2. | Chester A. Bain, Vietnam, The Roots of Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 69. |
| 3. | Ibid., 93–95 . Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (New York: Praeger, 1967, 2 vols.), I, 172–174. |
| 4. | Ibid., 18–24 ,89; Hammer, op. cit., 118, 229, 284–287, 347–48, 360–62; Shaplen, 116–119. U.S. Department of the Army, Minority Groups in the Republic of Vietnam (DA Pamphlet 550–105, 1966), 808–824--N.B., maps in text of sect areas are drawn from this source. |
| 5. | Warner, op. cit., 95—96; Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, 155–158; Bain, op. cit., 118; Report of the Saigon Military Mission, op. cit., 28. |
| 6. | Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, 142–148; DA Pamphlet 550–105, op. cit., 826–860; NIS 43D, 32. |
| 7. | Ibid; DA Pamphlet 550–105, op. cit., 1020–1048. |
| 8. | U.S. Department of State, The Communist Subversive Threat in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (Office of Intelligence Research, 29 December 1955), 8–10. |
| 9. | See map, Tab 1, p. 21. |
| 10. | Ibid.; U.S. Dept. State, The Communist Subversive Threat in Vietnam, op. cit., 10. |
| 11. | Ibid, 10–15; A. L. Nutt, Troika on Trial, op. cit., 250–253. |
| 12. | Douglas Pike Viet Cong (Cambridge: MIT, 1966), 2–30; Rand Corporation Memoranda dealing with Viet Cong motivation and morale (Santa Monica dates shown): W. S. Davison and J. J. Zasloff, A Profile of Viet Cong Cadres, RM-4983-ISA/ARPA, June, 1966; Zasloff , RM-4703-ISA/ARPA, op. cit; L. Goure, A. J. Russo, and D. Scott, Some Findings of the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study, RM-4911-ISA/ARPA. |
| 13. | This lack of de facto independence has figured in recent controversy over Diem's responsibility to the Geneva Agreement signed by France, e.g., Kahin and Lewis, op. cit., 56–57. |
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