Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/244

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET – Sensitive

from the DRV, and shortly thereafter DRV officials formally presented 45 tanks to Kong Le. U.S. aerial photography identified also Soviet-made artillery and radar in use by the Pathet Lao. Truck convoys of 20 to 300 vehicles were observed entering laos carrying munitions, rice, motor fuel, and NVA troops. Altogether, the combined communist forces demonstrated significant military superiority over the RIG forces. Rightist forces (under Phoumi Nosavan), U.S . military aid notwithstanding, were markedly unsuccessful in stemming the communist drive. In May, 1961, a truce was struck, and the conflict was carried into international conference; at Geneva on 23 July 1962, a new political settlement was reached. As of that period, U.S. intelligence reported 12 NVA battalions in laos, some 6,000 strong. In addition, 3,000 NVA personnel were serving with PL units. 199/

The Geneva Agreement on Laos of 1962 consisted of joint declaration by the several nations concerned with Indochina -- including the U.S., the DRV, and the GVN -- agreeing that-Laos would be neutralized:

"All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para- military formations and foreign military personnel shall be withdrawn from Laos … the introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel into Laos of armaments, munitions, and war materiel generally, except such quantities as the Royal Government of laos may consider necessary for the national defense of Laos, is prohibited …"

In concert with the Pathet Lao, the DRV circumvented these agreements. Although measures were taken to conceal DRV presence and ostensibly to withdraw DRV forces -- 40 North Vietname se were removed under ICC observation -- U .S . intelligence obtained good evidence, including a number of eye witness statements, that the bulk of the NVA forces remained in Lao; U.S. estimates placed NVA strength in Laos in early 1963 at 4,OOO troops in 8 battalions, plus 2,000 Pathet Lao advisors. 200/

In any event, by late 1960 the DRV could look upon its Laotian enterprise as successful in substantially expanding its sphere of influence in Laos, to include control over the territory adjacent to South Vietnam over which pass ed its "Ho Chi Minh Trail" of infiltration (see map). Eventually the enterprise brought about withdrawal of the U.S . military pres ence from Laos, per the Geneva Agreement of 1902. If the Vientiene government, braced with broad U.S. aid, surprised the DRV with its resiliency, it at least proved unable to challenge the Pathet Lao -- and DRV -- gains. Whatever the DRV longer term goal in Laos, reunification of Vietnam seemed there-after to take priority over further extension in Laos. In any event, the

DRV succeeded in securing its Laotian frontier from U.S. or Laotian

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