Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
(Another Defector) I was a political officer. I went to the North just like all the other combatants in my unit. I believed, at the time, that regroupment was only temporary, because from the study sessions on the Geneva Agreement we drew the conclusion that we could return to the South after the general elections.
(A PW) [Our political officer] explained that: we were granted Vietnam north of the 17th parallel now, but in 1956 there would be a general election and we would regain the South and be reunited with our families. Because of interest and curiosity and the opportunity to travel, everyone was happy. They thought they would be there in the North only two years and then would be able to return to their homes.
a/ RM 4703, 27, 35.
b/ Ibid., 34.
c/ Ibid., 35.
d/ Ibid., 36.
141. DIA, "Role …," 50–53; CIA, "… Evidence of North Vietnamese Violations of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam Since 1955" (SC No. 2955/64, 10 March 1964), Section I.
142. DIA, "Role …," 20–26; CIA, "Evidence…" (SC No. 2955/64), loc. cit.
143. Cf., Pike, op. cit., 31–56, 74–84.
144. DIA, "Role …," 47–48.
145. Ibid., 49–50.
146. Ibid., 46–47.
147. U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). (Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence , ST-67-023, 29 April 1967)·
148. Carver, op. cit., 363–364.
149. CIA, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 7 July 1955, mentions the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi's hint that violent action would ensue were consultations delayed, but there was little other indication of Soviet intention to act.
