Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
However, the July 1956 NIE took the position that the DRV was unlikely to use its capabilities for instituting such large-scale guerrilla action within South Vietnam during the next year or so. Yet, Diem's unforeseen success in dealing with non-communist challenges led to increasing hope that he would be able to survive even a later confrontation with the communists.
" … Diem's success in by-passing the July 1956 election date without evoking large scale Communist military reaction will reassure many Vietnamese and encourage them to cooperate with GVN programs to expose and root out Communists. Continued improvement in internal security will depend in some measure on the government's ability to deal with economic and social problems and on the effectiveness of the administrative apparatus.
"If the Communists were to undertake large scale guerrilla action in South Vietnam, they probably would not be able to develop widespread popular support, especially if the VNA were to register some early military success. The GVN is being increasingly accepted as a nationalist alternative to Communist leadership. Public confidence in the GVN, combined with general war-weariness, may have already reached the point where any effort to upset the government by force would lead to a strong popular reaction against the guerrillas. (Ibid., p. 14)
This NIE came close to being a high-water mark in optimism concerning Diem's ability to meet his dual challenges, both short and long run. But political trends that could restore the vigor of his non-communist opposition were seen:
" … The trend toward authoritarian rule through the political parties led by Diem's relatives and small circle of trusted associates will probably continue. Isolation and neutralization of government critics and men disliked or distrusted by Diem will also continue. Diem and his associates are likely to exert strong pressures against any opposition in the Assembly. Thus it is not likely that Diem or his government will meet any serious opposition in the National Assembly during the period of this estimate [through mid-1957]; however, over a longer period the accumulation of grievances among various groups and individuals may lead to development of a national opposition movement … " (Ibid., p. 14)
In January, 1957, MAAG Vietnam's semi-annual report to the Secretary of Defense (Country Statement on MDAP, Non-NATO Countries, date cited) noted hopefully that:
"The internal security situation in Vietnam has improved during the last year in regards to the dissident sects. Viet Minh armed cadres total approximately 1,370 effectives, Hoa Hao
