Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
public relations and public information programs of the government of Viet Nam directed both internally to the free Vietnamese and externally to north Viet Nam.…"[1]
"Assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh."[2]
Otherwise, however, the new policy paper (NSC 5809 of April 2, 1958) was identical to its 1956 predecessor.
In late May of 1958 the Operations Coordinating Board submitted a progress report on U.S. programs in Vietnam which held that "in general we are achieving U.S. objectives in Viet-Nam." Among major operating problems facing the U.S., the report cited Vietnam's continued dependence on foreign aid: "In spite of some evidence of greater economic stability, Viet-Nam continues to depend on foreign aid, the largest part of which goes to support the military establishment. U.S. aid still accounts for approximately 85 percent of imports in two-thirds of the budgetary revenues." Also cited were the "political and security problems of the Viet-Nam Government":
"President Ngo Dinh Diem's policy of strict control in the political and economic fields has caused a certain amount of internal dissatisfaction. Should the President's exercise of personal authority develop too far there may be danger that the resultant frustration of government officials might weaken the united support for his regime which the situation requires. Otherwise, the President's stern police measures and his emphasis on internal security have led to some criticism of the government. This emphasis on internal security stems from the recent emergence of the country, continuation of communist-inspired violence and subversion, and such incidents as the assassination of local officials in rural areas of southern Vietnam … "
The OCB report took up the note that the U.S. should "encourage and assist elements of the Army of Vietnam to establish and utilize specific anti-subversive guerrilla formations and operations," but stated that anti-guerrilla operations interfered with the efficient training of the army:
- ↑ Proposed by CIA and evidently adopted, although this is not altogether clear in DOD files. A further CIA revision, not adopted, would have added: "In this effort priority should be given to areas of greatest dissidence, particularly in the extreme south."
- ↑ A CIA proposed amendment, evidently not approved, would have added: "Also encourage and assist elements of the Army of Viet Nam to establish and utilize specific anti-subversive guerrilla formations and operations. In the anti-guerrilla campaign encourage the government of Viet Nam to use the Vietnamese Army in a way which will help win the favor of the local populace in order to obtain its support for their campaigns, particularly for intelligence purposes."
