Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
C. Recognition of Crisis, 1960
1. Country Team Assessment, March, 1960
By January 1960 communist terrorism and guerrilla action moved in U.S. estimates from the status of a long run threat to the viability of the Diem regime to crisis status as the GVN's "number one problem." In a long "Special Report on Internal Security Situation in Vietnam" (Incl 1 to Despatch #278 from Saigon, 7 March 1960), the U.S . Mission in Saigon submitted an appreciation of the problem which highlighted so many characteristics of the difficulties confronting Diem. and U.S. policy that were to prove critical in subsequent years that it deserves extensive quotation and precis:
Internal security had once again become the primary problem of the GVN as a result of: (1) "intensification of Viet Cong guerrilla and terrorist activities"; (2) "weaknesses apparent in the GVN security forces"; and (3) "the growth of apathy and considerable dissatisfaction among the rural populace." "The situation has grown progressively more disturbing since shortly after the National Assembly elections at the end of August 1959, despite the fact that President Diem was claiming, to the end of December, that internal security was continuing to improve."
a. "Viet Cong Activity"
Government operations had intens ified during the spring of 1955 when it increased its forces engaged in internal security operations, added precautions taken by the GVN during the period prior to and immediately following the August 30 National Assembly elections further suppressed VC activity. The upswing in VC operations first showed up in a sharp increase in assassinations and kidnappings in the last half of September. Where the total for assassinations in 1958 had been 193, there were 119 assassinations in the last four months of 1959 (for a yearly total of 233); in January 1960, there were to be 96 civilians killed and in February, 122. Meanwhile, significant Viet Cong attacks on GVN military forces also began in September, revealing characteristics on both the Viet Cong and GVN sides that were to become dishearteningly familiar in the next five years:
"The post-election intensification of VC attacks began with the completely successful engagement of two ARVN companies on September 26. The poor performance of ARVN during this operation exposed a number of weaknesses which have been commented upon by many CAS and MAAG sources in the Vietnamese Government. MAAG's evaluation of the factors contributing to ARVN's failure include security leaks, inadequate planning, lack of aggressive leadership, failure to communicate information to other participating units and the failure of supporting units to press forward to engage the VC (they were close enough to hear the sound of gunfire at the time). Another factor of importance illustrated in this ambush was the
