Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
members. At this meeting, the President discussed Lansdale's report, and apparently indicated that Lansdale would be sent to Vietnam in "a high capacity." If the appointment of Lansdale to replace Durbrow was under active consideration there is no record so indicating. In March, Frederick E. Nolting was appointed to replace Ambassador Durbrow. (Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, op cit., 320; Shaplen, "The Lost Revolution," op. cit. 148-149)
d. Implementing the CIP
In the meantime, the Ambassador and the Chief, MAAG, carried out their instructions from Washington, obtaining an interview with Diem and Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency, on February 13, 1961. Both Diem and Thuan expressed concern as to how they could finance the local currency costs for the . additional 20,000 men. The Ambassador expressed his firm conviction that by taking "extraordinary measures" the Vietnamese government could raise sufficient piasters. When Thuan asked what the U.S. position would be if the Vietnamese could not see their way to finance the plan as a whole, the Ambassador replied that the plan was a "comprehensive document" and therefore all facets should "basically be carried out." The Ambassador reported that he was "not very sanguine" that an agreed plan could be worked out by the end of February. (From Saigon Deptel 1367, 13 February 1961, summarized in State Department Research Project No. 630, op. cit., p. 15)
A month later, Ambassador Durbrow discussed the status of GVN acceptance of the CIP with Thuan. On the political measures:
" … He repeated question of bringing opposition members into cabinet would depend on whether such persons would agree with government policy. I replied I felt certain GVN would find loyal oppositionists who would be in basic agreement with policy and therefore urged this step be taken. Thuan expressed skepticism. He repeated legislative investigation of executive only practiced in US, therefore GVN would not accept this suggestion." (Saigon 1454 to SecState, 11 March 1961, p. 1)
On March 16, Durbrow raised the subject of the CIP with Diem; by this time it was clear that agreement was being reached on the main military CIP suggestions to a degree "which MAAG considers it can live with provide d GVN follows through with proper implementation," but the GVN position on other "fundamental" (in Durbrow's eyes) CIP suggestions -- i.e ., in the political sphere -- was not yet clear. (Saigon Deptel 1466, to SecState, 16 March 1961) Durbrow enumerated these remaining questions:
