Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/9

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


TOP SECRET – Sensitive

As early as January 1955, President Diem was stating publicly that he was unlikely to proceed with the Geneva elections:

"Southern Viet-Nam, since it protested the Geneva Agreement when it was made, does not consider itself a party to that Agreement, nor bound by it.

"In any event, the clauses providing for the 1956 elections are extremely vague. But at one point they are clear — in stipulating that the elections are to be free. Everything will now depend on how free elections are defined. The President said he would wait to see whether the conditions of freedom would exist in North Viet-Nam at the time scheduled for the elections. He asked what would be the good of an impartial counting of votes if the voting has been preceded in North Viet-Nam by a campaign of ruthless propaganda and terrorism on the part of a police state."[1]

As the deadline for consultations approached (20 July 1955), Diem was increasingly explicit that he did not consider free elections possible in North Vietnam, and had no intention of consulting with the DRV concerning them. The U.S. did not — as is often alleged — connive with Diem to ignore the elections. U.S. State Department records indicate that Diem's refusal to be bound by the Geneva Accords and his opposition to pre-election consultations were at his own initiative. However, the U.S., which had expected elections to be held, and up until May 1955 had fully supported them, shifted its position in the face of Diem's opposition, and of the evidence then accumulated about the oppressive nature of the regime in North Vietnam. "In essence," a State Department historical study found, "our position would be that the whole subject of consultations and elections in Viet-Nam should be left up to the Vietnamese themselves and not dictated by external arrangements which one of the parties never accepted and still rejects."[2] Secretary of State Dulles explained publicly that:

"Neither the United States Government nor the Government of Viet-Nam is, of course, a party to the Geneva armistice agreements. We did not sign them, and the Government of Viet-Nam did not sign them and, indeed, protested against them. On the other hand, the United States believes, broadly speaking, in the unification of countries which have a historic unity, where the people are akin. We also believe that, if there are conditions of really free elections, there is no serious risk that the Communists would win...."[3]
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
5


  1. Interview with Max Lerner, transcript in OSD files, dated 24 Jan 55. Cf., "Vietnam Demands a Time Extension," New York Times, 23 Jan 55.
  2. U.S. Department of State, "The Shift in the United States Position Toward Vietnamese Elections Under the Geneva Accords" (RM-765), 1 Sep 65.
  3. Press Conference, 28 June 55.