NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 TOP SECRET – Sensitive
The present situation in SVN was painted in somber tones of declining GVN control and deterioration within ARVN while VC strength and NVN-supplied arms were on the rise. To introduce U.S. combat troops for the protection of Saigon under these circumstances, McNamara stated, would create "serious adverse psychological consequences and should not be undertaken." A U.S. movement from the advisory role to a role which would amount to command of the war effort was similarly rejected without discussion because of anticipated adverse psychological effects. Thus, the fear of undesirable impacts upon a weak GVN caused at least one major course of action to be ruled out. Although fears of adverse impacts in domestic U.S. politics were not mentioned it is inconceivable that such fears were not present.
Having ruled out U.S. active leadership and the commitment of U.S. troops, Secretary McNamara analyzed three possible courses of action: (1) negotiations leading to the "neutralization" of SVN; (2) the initiation of military actions against NVN; and (3) measures to improve the situation in SVN. The first of these was incompatible with the U.S. objective stated at the beginning of the NSAM; the time was not propitious for adoption of the second; the third was recommended for adoption. Additionally, Secretary McNamara recommended NSAM 288 proclaimed that plans be made so that the U.S. would be in a position at a later date to initiate military pressures against NVN within a relatively brief time after any decision to do so might be made.
Many of the steps approved in NSAM 288 were highly programmatic. It should be observed that they were also palliative, both in scope and degree. Of the twelve approved actions, two addressed possible future actions beyond the borders of South Vietnam. Of the remaining ten, three were declaratory in nature (e.g., "To make it clear that we fully support the Khanh government and are opposed to any further coups"). The seven actions implying additional U.S. assistance (some of it advice) dealt with such matters as exchanging 25 VNAF aircraft for a newer model, replacing armored personnel carriers with a more reliable model, and trebling the fertilizer program within two years. The additional cost of the programs was only slightly more than $60 million at the most: $30-$40 million to support a 50,000 man increase in RVNAF and to raise pay scales; $1.5 million to support an enlarged civil administrative cadre; and a one time cost of $20 million for additional and replacement military equipment.
It is clear with the advantage of hindsight that these steps were grossly inadequate to the magnitude of the tasks at hand -- particularly if the broad U.S. objectives stated in the NSAM were to be realized. But such hindsight misses the policymakers' dilemma and the probable process by which the approved actions were decided upon. President Johnson had neither a congressional nor a popular mandate to Americanize the war or to expand it dramatically by "going north." U.S. hopes were pinned on assisting in the development of a GVN strong enough to win its own war. Overt U.S. leadership might undercut the development of such a government in Saigon. The course of policy adopted was not the product of an attempt to select the "best" alternative by means of examining expected benefits; it resulted from a determination of the "least bad" alternative through an examination
