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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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of Ho's communist contacts at this time is peculiar when they are forcing collaboration or preparing a puppet government; this a possible diversion from French policy in Indochina. O'Sullivan 131 to Byrnes, 3 December 1946 |
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| 57. | Acheson instruct Moffat on Ho Chi Minh communist record and offers guidelines of U.S. policy in discussion with Ho. Essentially, the U.S. is concerned over Tonkin events, the American people have welcomed Indochinese attainments but violence imperils this sympathy, and U.S. is informing France similarly. The U.S. is not making formal intervention at this time. Acheson 305 to Saigon, 5 December 1946 | 85 |
| 58. | U.S. feels France would engage in full scale military operations only if forced, since they realize it is no longer possible to maintain a closed door. However, Cochin-China political question must be settled French cannot resolve it without fight. The Cochin-Chinese prefer Tonkin to France. Reed 472 to Byrnes, 6 December 1946 | 87 |
| 59. | Secretary Byrnes reviews basic French-Vietnamese difficulties for Missions at London, Moscow, and Nanking. Essentially, the difficulties revolve around deep nationalist sentiment and opposition to the French, guided by a few communist trained leaders in the government with apparent contacts with Moscow and Yenan. However, "French influence is important not only as an antidote to Soviet influence, but to protect Vietnam and SEA from future Chinese imperialism." Three basic troubles are mutual distrust, French irresolution of the term "free state," and Vietnamese intransigence. Byrnes message to certain Missions 17 December 1946 | 88 |
| 60. | Byrnes reviews recent French political crisis and influence of Indochina policy as an important factor. Outbreak of hostilities in Hanoi seen as serious and not likely to be resolved by Moutet and d'Argenlieu. Byrnes message to Moscow, Nanking and Saigon, 20 December 1946 | 90 |
| 61. | Vincent informs Acheson that with inadequate forces and divided public opinion, the French have tried to accomplish in Indochina what a strong, united Britain found unwise to attempt in Burma. In short, "guerrilla warfare may continue indefinitely." The | |
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