Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. a.djvu/166

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

OUTGOING TELEGRAM


TOP SECRET

Department of State

Washington
—2—

TOP SECRET

such move by Schuman[1] Govt precipitate crisis? Is there any possibility that Communists might support such a measure or at least abstain from voting against it, as their line has consistently favored Quote Union of 3 kys Unquote?

3) How can approach to French best be made? In respect Baeyens' views (Embtel 3453< Jun 30) and rptd statements of Daridan that he does not believe Schuman govt would risk its political life to brine question before assembly, Dept believes that if desired results to be obtained, it must be done at highest level; i.e. Schuman, Bidault and Coste-Floret in spite latter's recent statement to Assembly (Embsiel 3155 Jun 15[2]) paralleled of course by high level approach to Bonnet[3] in Washington.

4) Should approach, if made, be confined for present only to change in status Cochinchina? In this connection, what is best timing?

5) What concessions are judged necessary to give plan fair start?

Dept cognizant of fact that fighting in Indochina has now continued for almost three years; that we believe given

  1. Robert Schuman, President of the French Council of Ministers (premier).
  2. Not printed.
  3. Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador.
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