NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
ANNEX No. 2
MILITARY SITUATION HI INDOCHINA
1. View of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a memorandum of 7 September to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated the following:
"Prior to 1 January 1951, the currently planned level of United States military aid to the French and native allied forces of Indochina should increase their military capabilities but not to the extent of counterbalancing Viet Minh capabilities. In view of these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that the proposed United States position take cognizance that the situation in Indochina is to be viewed with alarm and that urgent and drastic action is required by the French if they are to avoid military defeat in Indochina. Such a setback would not only be detrimental to the prestige of the French and the United States but it could also jeopardize the United States military position in Asia."
2. Conclusions of Joint MDAP Survey Mission. After observing conditions in north and south Indochina, General Erskine, Chief of the Military Group of the Joint MDAP Survey Mission in Southeast Asia, reported the following conclusions on 5 August 1950:
"(a) Military assistance will have to be provided to the French in Indo-China on a considerable scale if the broad objective of assisting in resisting the encroachment of Communism in Southeast Asia is to be successfully achieved. The assistance which has been requested, up to this time, is considered inadequate to fully consummate the U.S. broad objective. Additional material and equipment will require additional personnel. "(b) The French forces in Indo-China, after approximately five years of warefare, are stalemated. Casualties in this type of warfare have been very high. "(c) The French Command and troops, after a very brief study and observations, appear to have lost a considerable amount of offensive spirit and have been frustrated in their efforts to restore internal security.
TOP SECRET
