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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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are weak and inadequate. The absence of artificial obstacles, demolition plans and adequate mibile reserves, adequate aircraft support, and the very small amount of artillary, "which is now disposed so that it is impracticable to coordinate and mass fires, appear to be the most outstanding weaknesses in the Tonkin area. Another important deficiency is to lack of sufficient personnel now available. Anti-tank defenses in the Tonkin area are practically non-existent. The Viet Minh activities in this area will probably prevent the free movemtnt of such reserves as are now available there."
3. CIA Estimate of the Prospects for Chinese Communist Action in Indochina During 1950 (ORE 50–50, 7 September 1950)
"Communist China at present possesses the capability for a successful invasion of Indochina. If Communist China, as a participant in the world Communist movement, were called upon to invade Indochina, it could probably be persuaded to initiate such an operation, Chinese Communist military commitments elsewhere would not necessarily militate against and invasion of Indochina because the Chinese Communists posses the forces necessary for military action - separately or simultaneously - against Indochina, Korea, Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macao.
"Despite this general capability and despite the existence of Chinese Communist military concentrations along the Indochina border, adequate for the task, it is estimated that an open Chinese Communist invasion - While possible and capable of being launched with little or no preliminary warning - is improbable in 1950 because considerations (from the standpoint of Ho Chi Minh, the Chinese Communists, and international Communism) favoring such action appear to be outweighed by considerations opposing it. It is highly probable, however, that the Chinese Communists will continue to expand military assistance to the Viet Minh forces (by measures short of open invasion) on a scale sufficient to provide those forces with the capability of achieving significant, but limited, objectives in 1950 and assuming that the French receive no more aid than is presently programmed, of eventually expelling the French without the add of a Chinese Communist invasion."
4. Chinese Communist Military Capabilities (ORE 50-50)
"Any invasion of Indochina by the Chinese Communists would probably be undertaken in cooperation with the forces of Ho Chi Minh. Sizable Chinese Communist military forces are in position to intervene in Indochina. Despite reports of actual and scheduled northward movements of certain Chinese Communist field forces, approximately 100,000 troops remain deployed along the Indochinese border. These units could launch an invasion of Indochina without
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