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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 108. | Asiatic neighbors consider Bao Dai a French puppet. The U.S. should realize that ECA and military aid from the U.S. do not constitute decisive factors in Indochina's problems. Therefore the Griffin Mission should not commit ECA or military aid to French Indochina unless France "gives requisite public undertakings re further steps leading to status similar to Indonesia." Stanton (Bangkok) 160 to Acheson, 17 February 1950 | 280 |
| 109. | The State Department submits to the NSC a report on "The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina," which analyzes the problem to determine measures to protect U.S. security in Indochina and prevent communist expansion in the area. NSC No. 64, 27 February 1950 | 282 |
| 110. | President Truman approves the designation of Mr. Robert A. Griffin as Chief of the Economic Survey Mission to Southeast Asia, with rank of Minister. Five basic objectives of the Mission are outlined; (1) determine needed projects of political significance; (2) prepare for Point 4 programs; (3) advise local officials of methods and extent of participation in Point 4; (4) brief U.S. representatives; and (5) investigate regional aspects of technical assistance. Department of State letter to Griffin, 1 March 1950 | 286 |
| 111. | The State Department maintains to the Department of Defense that Indochina is subject to immediate danger and is the "most strategically important area of Southeast Asia." Dean Rusk believes that the resources of the U. S. should be deployed to "reserve Indochina from further Communist encroachment." Dean Rusk, Deputy Undersecretary of State to General James H. Burns, Defense Representative to Southeast Asia Aid Committee, 7 March 1950 | 288 |
| 112. | Acheson instructs Saigon, in light of anticipated Franco-Viet friction on handling U.S. aid, that function of Griffin Mission is "clearly understood to be fact finding." Acheson 136 to Saigon, 9 March 1950 | 289 |
| 113. | Griffin replies that "I understand that ours is an economic aid mission" and that the budding controversy could jeopardize the economic aid program. The French show no enthusiasm for Point 4. Gullion (Saigon) 176 to Acheson, 13 March 1950 | 290 |
| 114. | Griffin submits his mission's preliminary conclusions on Indochina with a listing of specific urgent programs totaling $23.5 million exclusive of military aid and indirect | |
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