explain. Strangely enough Dr. Rolfes discerns in Zeller's universally recognized masterpiece of critical research an attempt on the part of its author to read his own "shallow deism" into Aristotle's doctrine. Is it not rather surprising that Zeller's preconceptions should unfit him for a work for which Thomas of Aquin and his partisans possess such marked advantages?
In a series of five theses Dr. Rolfes aims to give the correct Aristotelian conception of God's relation to the universe and to man. God is the beginning and end of all things, not only as τὸ τέλος, but also as efficient cause and living power; he is the creator of the world and its personal, guiding principle, omniscient, omnipotent, and free. The human soul is spiritual in its essence, of divine origin, and immortal. Although Aristotle conceives the deity as the ethical end of humanity, he purposely neglects the religious element in man, confining himself to his worldly perfection. On the whole, then, Aristotle's theology agrees with the Christian conception of the divinity,—a result which cannot but shame unbelief and strengthen our faith in God. The great Greek thinker merits the title of prince of philosophers, and furnishes the proper starting-point for a true philosophy. In the face of these facts, the achievements of scholasticism cannot be ignored with impunity.
Chief stress is, and must be, laid by the author on his first thesis, which asserts the efficient causality of the prime mover. He brings his most effective artillery into action here for the purpose of fortifying a position which forms the key to the whole situation. Accordingly this part comprises the best portion of the book. In the works of Zeller and others, Aristotle's God moves not as efficient principle, but after the manner of a final cause, as a quiescent, inactive end. A reversal of this interpretation does not seem to be warranted by the evidence offered by Dr. Rolfes. The utmost that his polemic could accomplish would be to bring into clearer relief the contradictions and inconsistencies found in Aristotle's writings. Yet it should be remembered that the passages quoted in support of our author's view contradict the spirit and principles of the great Greek's metaphysics,—a fact which diminishes their weight. Aristotle frequently declared that the first cause is contemplative, being endowed with intellectual activity only (θεωρία), not active in the sense expressed by the words πράττειν and ποιεῖν. He says: κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε. τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα … κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενον δὲ τᾶλλα κινεῖ. (Met. 12, 7). It is evident in what sense God is the πρῶτον κινοῦν. He moves without acting, as the good, as the perfect, eternal end after which all things strive. How could there be motion in this immaterial spirit or eternal form which is all actuality, ἐνεργεία, when motion is defined as the transition from potentiality to actuality, ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὅντος ἐντελέχεια ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστι?
