SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.
[ABBREVIATIONS. — Am.J. Ps. = American Journal of Psychology; Ar.f. G. Ph. = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Int. J. E. = International Journal of Ethics; Phil. Jahr. = Philosophisches Jahrbuch; Phil. Man. = Philosophische Monatshefte; Phil. Stud. = Philosophische Studien; Rev. Ph. = Revue Philosophique; R. I. d. Fil. = Rivista Italiana di Filosofia; V. f. w. Ph. = Vierteljahrschrift für wissen-schäftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn. = Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane. — Other titles are self-explanatory.]
LOGICAL.
Judgments affirming something of reality, judgments of reality (Real-urtheile), may be divided into ontological judgments of reality, which make affirmation concerning a given concrete fact, and Real-verknüpfungs-urtheile, which affirm that two realities are so combined that when one is present the other is present also. Propositions expressing a relationship between different ideas are called judgments of relation (Bezie-hungs-urtheile). These may be classified as, (a) analytical judgments, (b) judgments of subsumption, (c) judgments of connection (Zusammen-hangs-urtheile), and (d) mathematical propositions. The latter are different in content from other judgments of relationship, as well as from those of reality. The distinction between judgments of reality and judgments of relation makes necessary an important differentiation in the kinds of deduction. This conclusion itself is a judgment of connection, and depends, not on the universality of the so-called major premise, but on the peculiar content of the judgment underlying the conclusion. The character of the conclusion is determined by the character of the intermediate proposition. We may, therefore, classify syllogisms according to this intermediate judgment, the most important one being the mathematical syllogism. A certain conclusion (whose notion is not already contained in the presupposition) follows necessarily from certain presuppositions. In the mathematical conclusion, as in the real conclusion, something new is presented in the result, but there is no uncertainty in the intermediate judgments of the former. No real judgment can result as the logical consequence of judgments of relation. Judgments of rela-
